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Abstract   
 
 
We present a model in which fire sales propagate shocks across bank balance sheets. 
When a bank experiences a negative shock to its equity, a natural way to return to 
target leverage is to sell assets. If potential buyers are limited, then asset sales depress 
prices, in which case one bank’s sales impact other banks with common exposures. 
We show how this contagion effect adds up across the banking sector, and how it can 
be estimated empirically using balance sheet data. We compute bank exposures to 
system-wide deleveraging, as well as the spillovers induced by individual banks. 
Applying the model to European banks, we evaluate a variety of interventions to 
reduce their vulnerability to fire sales during the sovereign debt crisis. 
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Abstract   
 
We present a model in which fire sales propagate shocks across bank balance sheets. When a bank 
experiences a negative shock to its equity, a natural way to return to target leverage is to sell assets. 
If potential buyers are limited, then asset sales depress prices, in which case one bank’s sales impact 
other banks with common exposures. We show how this contagion effect adds up across the banking 
sector, and how it can be estimated empirically using balance sheet data. We compute bank 
exposures to system-wide deleveraging, as well as the spillovers induced by individual banks. 
Applying the model to European banks, we evaluate a variety of interventions to reduce their 
vulnerability to fire sales during the sovereign debt crisis. 
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  I.  Introduction 
 
When a bank experiences financial stress, its troubles may spill over to other banks and 
threaten to contaminate the broader financial system. This is what regulators refer to when they 
define and measure systemic risk.  
Researchers have emphasized two distinct channels by which financial shocks propagate 
across institutions. The first channel relies on direct linkages between banks. When two parties write 
a financial contract such as a swap agreement, a negative shock to one party can transmit to the other 
as soon as one is unable to honor the contract (e.g., Allen and Babus 2009, Gorton and Metrick 
2012, Giglio, 2013). Direct linkages of this type can propagate distress, because once defaulted 
upon, the creditor bank may in turn lack the funds needed to deliver on its on its obligations to third 
parties (Duffie 2011, Kallestrup et al., 2011, Diebold and Yilmaz, 2011).   
A second propagation channel involves fire-sales. When a bank sells illiquid assets to reduce 
its leverage, the sale may depress prices because of a lack of unconstrained buyers, which in turn can 
trigger financial distress at other banks that hold the same assets. Affected banks may in turn sell 
other assets in an attempt to shore up their balance sheets. Contamination can occur across 
seemingly unrelated assets and across seemingly unrelated institutions. Liquidation spirals of this 
sort have been suggested in the extensive theoretical literature on fire-sales, and are widely believed 
to be important drivers of systemic risk in modern financial markets.
1  
This paper develops a simple linear model of fire-sales spillovers that can be readily 
estimated using simple data on bank balance sheets. Our model takes as given (1) the asset holdings 
of each financial institution, (2) a balance-sheet adjustment rule applied by institutions when they are 
                                                 
1 See Shleifer and Vishny (1992, 2011), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Gromb and Vayanos (2007), Schwarcz (2008), 
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), Allen, Babus, and Carletti (2011) for discussion of fire-sale-driven amplification.  
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hit by adverse shocks and (3) the liquidity of these assets on the secondary market (i.e., the price 
impact generated by asset liquidations). Using these assumptions, we can describe the evolution of 
bank balance sheets following shocks to the value of their assets.  
We use the model to develop simple formulas of how fire-sale spillovers add up across 
banks, and how susceptible individual banks are to episodes of deleveraging by others. A key output 
is a measure of a bank’s contribution to financial sector fragility, a quantity that we call 
systemicness. Systemicness is proportional to the product of size, leverage, and “connectedness”. In 
our model, a bank is “connected” when it owns large and illiquid asset classes to which other banks 
also have high exposures. When a highly connected bank sells assets to reduce leverage, its overall 
impact on other banks is large, because the prices of assets it sells fall, and because the assets are 
held by other banks that in turn must mark down their balance sheets.  
When financial regulators assess the soundness of a bank, they typically measure the 
vulnerability of the bank to different adverse scenarios. But our model suggests an important 
distinction between a bank’s vulnerability and its systemicness. To see the distinction, consider a 
small but highly leveraged bank with a portfolio of risky assets. Such a bank may be quite vulnerable 
to financial sector deleveraging, in the sense that price impact of fire sales elsewhere in the financial 
system may significantly impair the bank’s balance sheet. But such a bank is unlikely to be systemic, 
because asset sales triggered by its distress would not trigger much in the way of spillovers.  
We develop a number of intuitive results regarding how the distribution of leverage and risk 
exposures across banks determines systemic risk. For instance, consider a negative return shock 
experienced by an asset that is held by a set of highly levered banks. This shock has a larger 
aggregate impact than if the same asset were held by less levered institutions, because the banks that 
hold the asset will have to sell more in a fire sale to maintain their target capital structure. More  
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generally, we show that the banking system is more susceptible to contagion when asset classes that 
are large in dollar terms are also held by the most levered banks. If the goal is to reduce fire-sale 
spillovers, then assets that are both volatile and illiquid should be dispersed across banks, since the 
same shocks generate less price impact in a deleveraging cycle. In contrast, if illiquid assets have 
low price volatility, then it is better to isolate these assets in separate banks, so that they are not 
contaminated by other assets, which in turn are subject to larger shocks. 
We show how the model can be used to simulate the outcome of various policies to reduce 
fire-sale spillovers in the midst of a crisis. As an example of such policy analysis, consider a forced 
merger between two vulnerable banks—Sorkin (2009) suggests this was one of the initiatives 
entertained by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York during the US financial crisis. Such a policy 
may affect systemic risk because it redistributes existing assets across banks, which may have 
different exposures to shocks, different sizes, or different leverage ratios. Alternatively, consider the 
policy question of how to distribute a fixed amount of equity capital from the government across a 
large set of distressed banks. We find that from the perspective of systemic risk minimization, 
stabilization policies that aim to fix vulnerability at individual banks can be inferior to policies that 
directly target the cross-bank spillovers.  
The model is straightforward to estimate using data on bank balance sheets such as is 
released in stress tests.
2 We apply the model to European banks during the 2010-2011 sovereign debt 
crisis, and use their holdings of sovereign bonds to estimate the potential spillovers that would occur 
in the event that a collection of European sovereigns experienced a significant haircut. Using bank 
holdings of sovereign bonds as inputs, we document a correlation between our estimates of bank 
vulnerability and equity drawdowns experienced by European banks in 2010 and 2011. We then use 
                                                 
2 See Duarte and Eisenbach (2014) for a discussion of how our model can be estimated using data from the call reports of 
US banks.  
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our data to evaluate various policy interventions. We show that forced mergers among the most 
exposed banks would not have reduced systemic risk very much. However, we show that modest 
equity injections, if distributed appropriately between the most systemic banks, can cut the 
vulnerability of the banking sector to deleveraging by more than half. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We first develop the model, solve it, and 
build intuition for financial sector stability under different configurations of leverage and risk 
exposure across the banks. We defer our discussion of an extensive related literature to Section III, 
where we explain how our approach compares to other measures of systemic risk, and especially to 
the CoVaR and SRISK systemic risk measures developed by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2010) and 
Acharya, Pedersen, Philippon and Richardson (2010). In Section IV, we use commercial bank 
exposures provided by the EBA’s July 2011 stress tests to compute the vulnerability of European 
banks to sovereign defaults. Section V explains how the model can be adapted to monitor 
vulnerability on a more dynamic basis using factor exposures. The final section concludes.  
 
II.    A Model of Bank Deleveraging 
  We start by describing the assumptions. The model combines these assumptions to generate 
easy-to-implement measures of systemic risk.  
A.  Setup 
There are two periods t=1,2, and N banks. Each bank n is financed with a mix of debt dnt and 
equity ent. At is the N×N diagonal matrix of banks’ assets so that each diagonal term ant = ent + dnt at 
date t. B is the N×N diagonal matrix of leverage ratios, such that each diagonal term bn=dnt/ent.  
Each bank n holds a portfolio of K assets: mnk is the weight of asset k in bank n’s portfolio. M 
is the N×K matrix of these weights. In each period, the vector of banks’ unlevered returns is:  
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Rt=MFt, (1)   
where the K×1 vector Ft denotes asset net returns. 
 
Assumption 1: Banks sell assets to return to leverage targets  
Suppose banks receive an exogenous shock R1 to the value of their assets at t=1. Because 
banks are levered, these shocks move banks away from their current leverage. We assume that banks 
respond by scaling up or down their total assets in period 2 so as to maintain a fixed leverage target 
on a mark-to-market basis. Such leverage-targeting is in line with empirical evidence in Adrian and 
Shin (2010), who show that commercial banks manage book leverage to offset shocks to asset 
values. 
Our assumption that banks target leverage via asset sales is admittedly simplistic, but it can 
be easily extended to contain more realistic features. First, banks may be using equity issues to 
return to leverage target. Provided that equity issues and assets sales are used in fixed proportions, 
the analysis that follows does not change (see Appendix). Second, because loans are typically held to 
maturity, banks are allowed to only slowly recognize losses in their books (see for instance Milbradt, 
2012). Banks can use this accounting flexibility to adjust their leverage more progressively than in 
our baseline model (Adrian and Shin, 2014). To account for this effect in an interesting way, the 
model must incorporate several rounds of deleveraging, where banks progressively get back to target 
leverage while slowly selling assets. We have implemented this extension, along with numerical 
simulations, in Appendix C. The outcome of this analysis is that progressive adjustment does not 
change our analysis much: The pace of asset sales slows down, but the cumulative sales are the 
same, and so are the induced losses. This is due to the linearity of the model.  
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Under the assumption of full leverage targeting, computing net asset sales is straightforward. 
If banks target leverage ratios given by the matrix B, then the N×1 vector of dollar net asset increases 
is A1BR1. When R1<0, banks with negative asset returns have to sell assets to deleverage. When 
R1>0, banks with positive returns need to borrow more to preserve leverage. The intuition of this 
formula is simple: suppose a bank with equity of 1 and debt of 9 experiences a 10% return on its 
assets, bringing its equity to 2. The bank has to borrow an additional 9 and use it to buy assets to 
return to the prior leverage of 9-to-1.  
In practice, banks will have more flexibility in dealing with a positive shock to bank equity, 
and so our model is most useful for thinking about dynamics following negative shocks and in which 
banks are highly constrained in how they return to target capital structure. 
If some elements of R1 are negative and very large, then it is possible that the A1BR1 vector 
may have some elements that are bigger in absolute value than banks’ assets. This happens if the 
initial shock is large enough to wipe out all of the equity of the bank, in which case no amount of 
asset sales will return the bank to target leverage: the bank has to liquidate all of its assets, 
represented by the vector A1.(1+R1). To take this situation into account, we can thus modify the 
vector of net asset increases by replacing it by A1.max(BR1,-1-R1), where “max” is the point-wise 
maximum matrix operator, defined by max(X,Y)=(max(Xn,Yn)). In Section IV we use this modified 
formula, because the shocks we consider in Europe are large enough to wipe out some banks. For 
now we focus on the simpler linear formula. 
Assumption 2: Target exposures remain fixed in percentage terms 
Second, we must describe which assets are sold to return banks to target leverage. We make 
the simplest assumption that banks sell assets proportionately to their existing holdings, which  
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means that the M matrix remains constant between dates 1 and 2. Let  be the K×1 vector of net 
asset (dollar) purchases by all banks in period 2. If banks keep their portfolios constant, then: 
=M' A1BR1.            ( 2 )  
For example, consider a bank with holdings of 30 percent in MBS and 70 percent in loans. If the 
bank scales down its portfolio by ten units, it will sell 3 units of MBS and 7 units of loans (or 
correspondingly reduce its new lending while rolling off existing loans). Equation (2) describes this 
in matrix form, summed over all banks: for each bank n facing a shock R1n, total net asset purchases 
are given by anbnR1n. For a given bank n, net purchases of asset k will be mnkanbnR1n.  
We have experimented with variations of this assumption—which is admittedly strong—to 
allow banks to first sell their most liquid assets (see Section IV). The constant portfolio assumption 
simplifies the algebra and the intuition below, but we later discuss how one can incorporate more 
nuanced liquidation rules that take into account different liquidity of bank assets. 
Assumption 3: Fire sales generate price impact 
Third, we assume that asset sales in the second period   generate price impact according to a 
linear model: 
  F2=L  ,             ( 3 )  
where L is a matrix of price impact ratios, expressed in units of returns per dollar of net purchase.
3 
Here we implicitly assume here that L is diagonal, meaning that fire sales in one asset do not directly 
                                                 
3 For instance, Pulvino (1998) estimates the discount associated with fire sales of commercial aircraft by distressed 
airlines. In equity markets, Coval and Stafford (2007) estimate the L coefficient using forced purchases and sales of stock 
by mutual funds (see also Ellul et al, 2011, and Jotikasthira et al, 2012 who use similar methodologies in other asset 
markets). Bank loans can also be sold on fairly liquid markets (Drucker and Puri, 2009).  
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affect prices in other assets. Yet, our matrix equations below are not modified if L contains off-
diagonal terms.
4  
Equation (3) assumes that price impact is linear, and proportional to the dollars of the asset 
being sold by financial institutions across the economy. This captures the spirit of most theoretical 
models of fire sales.  To see this, suppose there are nonspecialist outside investors with a fixed dollar 
amount of outside wealth W who provide liquidity to the banking sector during a fire sale, but trade 
off the returns to outside projects with the returns to investing in fire sold assets. In such a setting, 
the equilibrium discount will be an increasing function of the total dollar amount of fire-sold assets 
(Shleifer and Vishny (2011), Stein (2012)). 
  We make the simplifying assumption that, in deciding how to return to capital structure, 
banks ignore the question of whether the selling is going to be productive, in the sense of being 
accretive to their capital.  In most cases, this is a reasonable assumption, but may turn out to be more 
problematic when a single bank’s fire-sold assets are large in dollar terms. In this case, selling the 
asset might be counter-productive in terms of leverage management if the price impact induced by 
the trade is large enough. In some extreme cases, there could be incentives to “pump” the price of a 
distressed asset to create the appearance of capital adequacy. In the Appendix, we describe the 
conditions under which asset sales are likely to be accretive to capital, in which case equation (3) is a 
reasonable assumption.  
 
                                                 
4 However, some of the intuitive expositions given below no longer hold when price impact takes on a more complex 
form. To the extent that off-diagonal elements are positive, this would further amplify the effects discussed below. 
Greenwood (2005) develops a model in which price impact spreads across similar assets. Off-diagonal price impact is 
reasonable when the assets being considered are similar in nature and their pricing is integrated across markets.  
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Combining Assumptions: Asset Returns Driven by Fire Sales 
We combine equations (1), (2) and (3) to calculate the effect of bank unlevered asset returns 
in t=1 on returns in t=2: 
R2 =MF2=ML=(MLM'BA1)R1.   (4) 
In principle, one can iterate multiple rounds of deleveraging following an initial shock, by further 
multiplying by the transition matrix MLM'BA1. Taken to the limit, the deleveraging process ends at a 
fixed point, which is a function of the eigenvalues of the transition matrix. For simplicity, we restrict 
our attention to the first round of deleveraging, because this delivers most of the useful intuitions 
about the relevant linkages between banks. In our simulations, we have experimented with 
continuing the deleveraging process over multiple rounds.
5  
 
B.  Measuring Aggregate Exposures to Deleveraging (“Aggregate Vulnerability”) 
Consider what happens after a negative shock -F1=(-f1,...,-fn) to asset prices: this translates 
into dollar shocks to banks’ assets given by A1MF1. The aggregate direct effect on all bank assets the 
quantity is then 1'A1MF1, where 1 is the N×1 vector of ones.  This direct effect does not involve any 
contagion between banks, it is simply the change in asset value driven by bank exposures. In the US 
and European stress tests, regulators sought to identify and quantify the direct effect across a variety 
of different shock scenarios.  
Following equation (4), we can compute the aggregate dollar effect of shock F1 on bank 
assets through fire sales. To do so, we pre-multiply MLM'BA1MF1 by 1'A1. We normalize this by 
total bank equity pre-delevering E1 and define “aggregate vulnerability” as: 
                                                 
5 In our empirical simulations using bank data, there is not much intuition gained by simulating the deleveraging process 
over additional rounds. Provided that the shocks are not too large, the rank ordering of banks in terms of their 
contribution to systemic risk is highly correlated across rounds.   
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1
1 1 1 1
E
MF BA M ML A
AV
 
           ( 5 )  
AV measures the percentage of aggregate bank equity that would be wiped out by bank deleveraging 
if there was a shock F1 to asset returns. As a reminder, this formula omits the direct impact of the 
shock on net worth, emphasizing only the spillovers across banks. If all assets are perfectly liquid 
(i.e., all elements of the L matrix are zero), then AV=0: there is no contagion across banks because 
delevering does not involve price impact, even though there is still a direct effect of the shock on 
banks asset values given by  1'A1MF1. 
To understand the intuition behind Eq. (5), using -R1=-MF1=(-r1t,...,-rnt)', we can rearrange 
terms slightly and expand: 
   (6) 
where   measures the “connectedness” of bank n. This is the extent to which 
bank n owns large ( anmnk
n
  large) or illiquid (lk large) asset classes. Where this is the case, one 
dollar of fire sales by bank n will lead to a larger amount of the banking system’s holdings, since it 
will reduce by more the price of larger asset classes.  
Equation (6) shows that the systemic risk is high when large banks (banks with large an1) are 
levered (large bn1), exposed to the shock in question (rn1), or connected (large n). These properties 
are intuitive: if large banks are levered and/or exposed, a given shock will trigger larger asset sales. 
In addition, if exposed banks hold assets that are illiquid and/or widely held, then price impact is 
large and the overall system is more vulnerable.  
More generally, the four elements of equation (6) – connectedness, leverage, size, and 
exposure – enter multiplicatively in determining AV. This means that the distribution of these 
11 1 , nnnn
n
AV E b a r   
n  ammmk
m
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 
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elements across the financial system matters enormously for systemic risk. For example, the formula 
tells us that from the perspective of spillovers, the cross-sectional correlation between bank size and 
leverage at any point in time is an important input.  
 
C.  Contribution of Individual Banks to Aggregate Deleveraging: “Systemicness” 
We can calculate the contribution that each bank has -- through fire-sale spillovers -- on the 
aggregate vulnerability of the banking system. To do this, we again focus on the impact of a shock 
F1, but assume it only affects bank n. In this case, it is easy to see that the impact coming from the 
liquidations of bank n on the aggregate of the banking system is: 
,   (7) 
where n is the N×1 vector with all zeros except for the n
th element, which is equal to 1. We call S(n) 
the “systemicness” of bank n. Systemicness can be interpreted as the contribution of bank n to 
aggregate vulnerability, as  . 
As we did for aggregate vulnerability, we can develop intuition by expanding terms in 
equation (7): 
   (8) 
which is the bank-level equivalent of Equation (6). Thus, a bank is more systemic if: 
  It is more connected (n is bigger): the bank owns assets that are both illiquid and widely held 
by other banks.  
  It is bigger (an/E1 is bigger): a given shock on a larger bank leads to more fire sales, which in 
turn leads to a large price impact. 
  It is more levered (bn is bigger): a shock to a more levered bank is going to induce it to sell 
more, which generates more price-impact. 
S(n) 
1' A1MLM'BA1n'n MF1
E1
AV  Sn  
n

1
1
() ,
n
nn n
a
Sn b r
E


  
 
  12
  It receives a bigger shock rn1 : when the magnitude (or expected volatility) of bank risk 
exposures increases, it can induce larger deviations from target leverage and thus large asset 
sales. 
 
D.  Impact of Deleveraging on each Bank: Indirect Vulnerability v. Direct Vulnerability 
We define a bank’s “indirect vulnerability” with respect to shock F1 as the impact of the 
shock on its equity through the deleveraging of other banks: 
 (9) 
IV(n)  measures the fraction of equity of bank n that disappears when other banks deleverage 
following shock F1. It differs from direct vulnerability, which is the direct exposure of bank n’s 
assets to shock F1: 
 (10) 
In our empirical applications, we will systematically contrast the two measures: IV involves the 
deleveraging spiral, while DV does not.  
To understand the intuition behind IV(n), we can expand terms in equation (9): 
. (11) 
The first term stands for the pure leverage effect: a given asset shock has a bigger impact on equity if 
the bank is more levered. The second term measures the importance of connections between banks. 
It is large when the bank is exposed to assets that are illiquid and exposed to heavy fire sales.  Notice 
how IV(n) differs – both conceptually and in the formula – from systemicness.  Bank size enters 
directly into systemicness (equation (8)), but not into vulnerability (equation (11)), which is 
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primarily driven by leverage and its exposure to shocks. For instance, a small bank can be vulnerable 
without being systemic. 
 
E.  Indirect Vulnerability of One Bank to Another 
Suppose one is interested in the impact of a single bank deleveraging (for example, if it were 
to fail and its assets were liquidated). In this case, we can compute IV in the special case where the 
vector of banks’ returns R1=m, i.e. assuming that bank m (and only bank m) will deleverage 
following a shock  to it assets. Then, following equation (9), the indirect vulnerability of bank n to 
a decrease of bank m’s assets by % is: 
 (12) 
This measure captures the interdependence through deleveraging of banks n and m. IV(n,m) is large 
when sender bank m is large and levered, when receiver bank n is levered, and more interestingly 
when the term   is big, i.e., when n and m own similar illiquid assets.  
 
F.  Properties of Vulnerability and Systemicness Measures 
i.   Heterogeneity and Systemic Risk 
One implication of equation (6) is that making the banks more similar may reduce fire sale 
spillovers, and thus AV. This contrasts with much of the existing literature on systemic risk, which 
assumes that systemic risk is high when banks have correlated stock returns.
6 The economic intuition 
for this result comes from two opposing effects. First, because banks liquidate all assets they hold 
                                                 
6 A notable exception is Wagner (2011) who considers a similar set of issues about the distribution 
of risks between banks. 
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when they receive shocks, shocks to liquid assets trigger fire sales of illiquid assets when banks own 
both types. This can make it stabilizing to ring-fence the illiquid assets into specific banks. 
Diversification also has an opposite effect: when all banks own all assets, any shock to asset prices 
will spread the fire sales across all asset holdings, which tends to reduce the total price impact. The 
diversification effect dominates when illiquid (high lk) assets receive stronger shocks (high fk). In this 
case, diversified (correlated) banks are better, because they can react to these shocks by partly 
selling liquid assets, reducing total price impact. But when liquid (low lk) assets receive bigger 
shocks (high fk), the contagion effect is more important, and stability can be increased by isolating 
illiquid assets into specific banks.  
To illustrate this intuition more formally, consider the case of N assets and N banks of 
identical size a and leverage b. If assets are equally spread across banks (heterogeneity), we have M 
= (11’)/N (this is a matrix where all coefficients are equal to 1/N) and         ∑  ̅   
 
     where 
 ̅= ∑    /   
     is the average liquidity of assets. In contrast, if each asset is exclusively held by one 
bank dedicated to that asset (homogeneity) M=Id., and         ∑      
 
    .  Thus homogeneity 
leads to lower AV than heterogeneity if ∑   ̅       
 
     0 , i.e. when assets with large shocks are 
more illiquid. 
ii.  Equivalence of “too big to fail” and “too many to fail”  
Another somewhat surprising property of AV is that it is not directly impacted by bank size. 
For instance, suppose we slice a bank into n smaller banks, each with the same asset mix and 
leverage as the original bank. It is straightforward to see from equation (6) that this leaves AV 
unchanged. This is because each of these new banks reacts to shocks exactly as the original bank, 
scaled by the ratio of their sizes. Thus, the combined impact on the rest of the system is exactly 
identical to that of the original bank (the aggregate quantity of each assets sold is identical). This  
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property is essentially a scaling property of our model, reflecting the fact that if all the assets and 
liabilities of a bank are increased by a constant factor, its asset sales in reaction to a shock are scaled 
up by that same factor. Conversely, merging banks with the same asset mix and leverage also has no 
impact on AV.  In summary, there is no difference in our set-up between a “too-big-to-fail” problem 
and a “too-many-to-fail” problem induced by a series of banks similar in leverage and asset 
composition.  
 
III.  Relation to Literature on Systemic Risk  
Our systemic risk and vulnerability measures contribute to a growing literature that studies 
linkages between financial institutions and the implications for fragility. Here we describe how our 
measures compare to prior research. 
The tradition in recent papers has been to infer bank linkages from correlations in market 
prices. A first set of papers seeks to estimate risk directly from bond or CDS (see for instance Ang 
and Longstaff (2011)). Giglio (2013), for example, uses the difference between bond and CDS 
spreads to estimate the joint probability of failure of large banks who are sellers of protection. A 
second set of papers measures systemic risk through comovement in the equity returns of financial 
intermediaries (Adrian and Brunnermeier (2010), Acharya, Pedersen, Philippon and Richardson 
(2010), Billio, Getmansky, Lo, and Pelizzon (2012), Diebold and Yilmaz (2011)).  
We depart from some of this literature by making simple assumptions about how funding 
shocks propagate across banks, i.e., we posit an economic structure to the propagation mechanism of 
initial shocks. To do so comes at some cost—we adopt a narrow definition of systemic risk based on 
banks’ common exposures, thus deemphasizing bilateral risks between banks. On the other hand, the 
benefits are that our model-based approach can be used to do ex post policy analysis.   
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The structure of our model is similar to Acemoglu, Ozdaglar and Tahbaz-Salehi (2012), who 
study the propagation of shocks in the real economy. They derive conditions under which aggregate 
volatility remains high even when the network is large.  
A contribution of our model relative to existing work is that it distinguishes between a bank’s 
contribution to the risk of aggregate deleveraging (“systemicness”), and a bank’s sensitivity to 
deleveraging by other banks (“indirect vulnerability”). Adrian and Brunnermeier (2010) define and 
estimate the “CoVaR” of institution n as the Value at Risk of the whole financial sector conditional 
on bank n being in distress. In our model, “systemicness” S(n) is similar to their CoVaR measure; 
the main difference being that, while CoVaR is estimated using comovement in stock returns, we put 
structure on the propagation mechanism, which could result in patterns of comovement that differ 
from comovement of returns observed during ordinary times. On the other hand, Acharya et al. 
(2010) propose a measure that is closer to our “indirect vulnerability” IV(n). For each bank, they 
estimate average returns during the 5% worst days of market conditions. They combine this estimate 
with bank leverage to compute the “marginal expected shortfall (MES),” which captures how much 
capital a bank must raise when faced with adverse market conditions. Finally, Billio, Getmansky, 
Lo, and Pelizzon (2012) measure systemic risk using bilateral time-series dependencies between 
firms. Diebold and Yilmaz (2011) discuss the relationship between cross-bank linkages estimated in 
this way and measures of network connectedness. Our cross-bank indirect vulnerability measure 
IV(n,m) can provide a structural foundation for some of these connections.  
Our paper is also connected to a flourishing theoretical literature that studies linkages of 
financial intermediaries (e.g. Eisenberg and Noe, 2001, Diebold and Yilmaz, 2011, Demange, 2011, 
Gouriéroux, Héam and Montfort, 2012). The main differences between these papers and ours are (1) 
our emphasis on deleveraging externalities (they focus on interbank contracts), and (2) the fact that  
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our model is easily calibratable (data on interbank lending are scarce, and often not public, and the 
literature is mostly theoretical). There are, however, a few important similarities. Our concept of 
Indirect Vulnerability (IV(n)) is similar in spirit to network centrality (Ballester, Calvò-Armengol 
and Zenou, 2006) which measures the extent to which a member of the network can easily be 
reached by the others. In our model, a bank is connected to others if it owns a similar, exposed, 
portfolio. Our concept of Systemicness (S(n)) is closer to the notion of “key player” (Ballester et al, 
2006; Denbee, Julliard, Li and Yuan, 2012; see also the “threat index” in Demange, 2011).  
Last, our analysis is closely related to policy proposals recently put forth by Duffie (2011) 
and Brunnermeier, Gorton, and Krishnamurthy (2011). Duffie (2011) proposes that a core group of 
large financial firms report their losses vis-à-vis their largest counterparties for a list of stressful 
scenarios. Brunnermeier, Gorton, and Krishnamurthy (2011) suggest eliciting firms’ sensitivities to 
different risk factors and scenarios. We build on this work by modeling these sensitivities, and 
quantifying how these stress scenarios could play out across the financial sector. 
 
IV.  The Vulnerability of European Banks 
In this Section, we apply the model to European banks in the fall of 2011. As the US 
subprime crisis subsided in 2009, investor attention shifted to the deteriorating fiscal position of a 
handful of European countries. Reflecting perceptions of default risk, interest rates on many 
sovereign bonds increased. Because many of these bonds were held by financial institutions, the 
widening interest rate spreads had the potential to cause a deleveraging cycle among the banks.  
We use data on European banks’ portfolios disseminated by the European Banking 
Authority in 2011 to estimate measures of systemicness and vulnerability that are suggested by our 
model. The data were released in the context of stress tests, which examined the direct vulnerability  
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of European Banks to shocks in the value of their holdings. We study the banks’ susceptibility to 
deleveraging cycle caused by a potential writedown of sovereign bonds (although the model could in 
principle be used to evaluate other shocks as well). After ranking banks based on their systemicness 
and vulnerability, we assess quantitatively the impact of policies that were designed to contain the 
damage of the crisis.   
 
A.  Data 
Published on the EBA website in July 2011, the European stress tests provide harmonized 
balance sheets for the 90 largest banks in the EU27 countries. The list includes both private and 
publicly listed financial companies. We draw the inputs to our calculations as follows. 
Matrix A1: The matrix of assets is obtained directly from the EBA data by taking, for each 
bank, the sum of all exposures. Diagonal elements ann are the “total exposure” in euros of bank n. 
The average exposure is €260 billion. The biggest bank is HSBC (€1440bn), the smallest one is 
Caixa d’Estalvis de Pollensa (€338 million).  
Matrix M: To calculate the exposure matrix M, we collapse the EBA data into 42 asset 
classes: sovereign debt of each of the 27 EU countries plus 10 others, commercial real estate, 
mortgages, corporate loans, retail SME and retail revolving credit lines. The M matrix is thus a 90 x 
42 matrix, where mnk is the fraction of exposure to asset k of bank m. Aggregate exposure to 
commercial real estate across the 90 banks is €1.2 tn (5% of banking sector assets); small business 
lending is €744 bn (3.2%); mortgages are €4.7 tn (20%); and corporate loans are €6.7 tn (29%). 
Sovereign bonds account for €2.3 tn (13%). 
Matrix B: The leverage matrix B is the diagonal matrix of debt-to-equity ratio. Following 
Adrian and Shin (2014), we use book leverage. To obtain each element bnn, we divide total exposure  
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(the ann element of A) minus book equity by book equity. Because some EU banks are very levered, 
this number has a few outliers (leverage ratios of 540 for Allied Irish Banks, 228 for the Agricultural 
Bank of Greece). Because we do not want our results to be driven by these outliers, we cap target 
leverage bnn at 30: this cap is imposed on 20 banks.  
Matrix L: We assume L=10
-13 x Id, where Id is a 42 x 42 diagonal matrix of ones. We 
therefore assume that all 42 assets have the same price impact coefficient. 10
-13 means that €10bn of 
trading imbalances lead to a price change of 10 basis points. This order of magnitude is in the 
neighborhood of recent empirical estimates of price impact in the bond market, such as Ellul, 
Jotikasthira, Lundblad, 2011, who study fire-sales of corporate bonds by insurance companies or 
Feldhutter, 2011, who measures selling pressure by comparing small and large trades of corporate 
bonds. Newman and Rierson (2003) estimate that the price impact associated with a 16-billion euro 
bond issuance by Deutsche Telekom was 10 basis points. Duffie, 2010, provides a summary of 
empirical results regarding price impact of large sales in assets markets. Nevertheless, our estimate 
may be an underestimate for less liquid asset classes, such as whole loans.  
Shock F1: We consider various writedowns in the value of Greek, Irish, Italian, Portugese, 
and Spanish debt (henceforth GIIPS debt).We study a 50% write-off of all GIIPS debt. Hence, the 
shock vector F1 is equal to zero for all 42 assets, except for the five GIIPS sovereign debts, for 
which we assume a return of -50%. Given banks’ exposures, the direct effect of this shock on 
aggregate bank equity is given by -1'A1MF1, which is equal to 381bn €, or 40.1% of aggregate bank 
equity. The shock we are feeding to the system is thus very large. 
 
B.  Vulnerability Rankings  
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We start by using the inputs above to compute vulnerability for each bank. We then validate 
the model by linking our vulnerability measures to the stock returns that the publicly listed banks 
experienced during the crisis.  
To compute IV(n), we use a modified version of equation (9), where we account for the fact 
that fire sales cannot exceed the total assets of a bank (see Section II.A.). This adjustment is 
necessary as some banks are so severely hit by the shock that we consider that it wipes out their 
equity entirely, in which case the remaining assets would be liquidated. This leads to the following 
definition of IV(n): 
       
  
      ′max	         ,    1        
   
 
where max(X,Y) is the element-by-element max operator. In this definition, we plug in the above 
matrices and the GIIPS shock vector F1. 
Table 1 lists the top 10 banks, sorted according to IV(n). To see how IV(n) differs from 
direct exposures, we also report direct vulnerability DV(n), computed according to equation (10).  
Rankings in terms of indirect and direct effect are far from being perfectly correlated: the Spearman 
rank correlation between DV and IV with respect to a GIIPS shock is 0.17, and is not significantly 
different from zero at the 5% level. On average, the direct impact of a full-blown GIIPS crisis would 
be to wipe out 1.11 times the equity for the average bank. To this direct effect, the impact of the 
subsequent deleveraging would further wipe out some 302% of the equity of the average bank. As a 
reminder, all estimates of the impact of deleveraging are contingent on price impact factor L. 
Between Dec 31, 2009 and July 22, 2011, European bank stocks (the subset of our sample 
which is publicly traded) fell by an average of 28%. What explains which banks experienced the 
worst returns? Surely some of the returns were explained by market participants’ views about the  
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direct exposures that these banks had to sovereign debt. But it is also conceivable that these returns 
reflected indirect vulnerability IV(n) to losses on GIIPS sovereign debt.  
We regress cumulative returns over 2010 through July 2011 of each bank on indirect 
vulnerability IV, controlling for direct vulnerability DV, bank size (as measured by log of bank total  
exposure log(an1)) and (target) leverage. These controls ensure that vulnerability to the deleveraging 
process IV(n) adds explanatory power beyond a bank’s direct exposure.  
Table 2 shows the results of these regressions. Out of 90 banks covered by the stress tests, 
only 51 are publicly listed, and we have complete returns data for 49 of them. The R
2 of indirect 
vulnerability alone is 9%, compared with 14% when direct exposure is also included. The bank size 
control does not affect the estimated impact of IV(n) on returns. The direct and indirect 
vulnerabilities have the same explanatory power on the cross-section of bank returns. For two banks 
that are one sample standard deviation apart in terms of IV(n), cumulative returns drop by 5 
percentage points more in the bank most exposed to sector-wide deleveraging. The last three 
columns of the table replace the dependent variable with returns computed over the shorter one-
month window of July 2011 during which the stress tests were released to the public. These results 
are slightly weaker in magnitude, perhaps reflecting the fact that much of the information released in 
the stress tests was already understood by the market. Although the sample size is limited, Table 2 
provides suggestive evidence that the market prices reflected indirect vulnerabilities of banks to a 
broader deleveraging cycle, and not only their direct exposures.  
 
C.  Systemicness Rankings  
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In this Section, we briefly discuss the properties of our systemicness measure S(n) on 
European Data. As for vulnerability, we amend equations (7) and (8) to ensure that bank-level total 
fire sales are less than total assets: 
      
1           
    max     ,1      
  
 
       
   
  
  m a x      
     ,1    
      , 
which shows that the systemicness of bank n can be decomposed into the product of three scalars: n, 
which captures the impact of bank n on other banks through deleveraging,  , which captures 
the relative size of bank n, and          
     ,1    
      , which reflects the size of fire sales by 
bank n.  
Table 3 reports the systemicness ranking for the 10 most systemic banks in Europe, along 
with the three components of the decomposition above. Unsurprisingly, in the overall sample, 
systemicness is correlated with size (spearman correlation of .52, statistically significant at 1%), but 
this correlation is far from perfect, as can be seen among the 10 most systemic banks. For example, 
HSBC, the largest EU bank, does not appear in this ranking. BNP Paribas, which is the second 
largest, is only the fifth most systemic bank. Size is more correlated with systemicness than leverage, 
but size does not explain everything because there is substantial heterogeneity across banks in terms 
of necessary fire sales. Bankia, which is relatively small, is among the most systemic banks because 
fire sales would be enormous (92% of its assets), and it is highly connected with the rest of the 
financial system through its asset holdings (its linkage component equals 0.42). Assuming, for 
instance, that Bankia had an average linkage level (0.30 instead of 0.42), its systemicness would be 
equal to 0.29x0.95x0.30=0.08, which would make it the 8
th most systemic bank instead of the 6
th.  
ann /E1 
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We have also examined the correlation between our measures of systemicness and SRISK 
from Acharya et al (2010), and Adrian and Brunnermeier’s (2010) CoVar measure. SRISK is 
conceptually similar to our measure in that it incorporates size and leverage. For the overlapping 
sample of firms, SRISK is 50% correlated with Systemicness, and CoVar is 54% correlated.  
The sum of systemicness across all 90 banks is equal to 2.45, which means that through the 
deleveraging process, our model predicts that 245% of aggregate bank equity would be wiped out 
(using the terminology of our model, AV = 2.45). This is sizeable, since the direct impact of the 
GIIPS writedown is only 40.1% of EU bank equity. The deleveraging effect is therefore 6 times 
larger than the direct shock.
7 In our following policy experiments, we focus on the deleveraging 
effect. 
D.  Policy simulations 
We now use the model to evaluate a number of different policies that have the potential to 
reduce deleveraging externalities. To be clear, the model does not take a position on whether banks 
are behaving optimally since it assumes an exogenous adjustment rule for banks. Thus, the 
interventions that follow should be interpreted as potential ex post interventions that could be used in 
a moment of crisis. The results of the experiments are reported in Table 4.  
 
GIIPS debt re-nationalization: We start by looking at the effect of reallocating GIIPS 
sovereign debt to banks in their home country. This exercise is motivated by two facts. First, 
between July and December 2011, under pressure of markets and regulators, GIIPS-based banks 
increased their holdings of GIIPS debt by about 1%, while non GIIPS-based banks reduced them by 
                                                 
7 To properly calibrate this effect, we would need to amend our exercise in two directions: change the L matrix so as to 
account for the fact that assets are less liquid, and change the liquidation rule of banks so as to account for the fact that 
banks fire-sell liquid assets more. The first change would make estimates of systemic risk bigger, while the second one 
would tend to reduce it.  
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about 22%. Second, between December 2011 and January 2012, while the ECB lent about €500 bn 
to euro-area banks, Spanish banks bought about 23bn euro of government debt and Italian banks 
some €20 bn. A partially intended consequence of prudential and monetary policies over the fall of 
2011 has thus been to re-nationalize GIIPS debt.  
We thus implement the reallocation of 20% of aggregate holdings of each sovereign back to 
the balance sheets of banks of its own country. First, for each sovereign k, we aggregate euro 
holdings by all banks according to sk  mnkan
n
 . For each bank n outside country k, we then remove 
 euro of sovereign k from its balance sheet. Then, for each domestic bank n' 
in country k, we inject the holdings in proportion of its holdings of the sovereign among banks of 
country k:  20% sk 
an'mn'k
ammmk
mdomestic

. This reallocation never leads to negative holdings as long as 
foreign banks own at least 20% of the aggregate holdings of sovereign k, which is the case in our 
simulation.
8 
Table 4 reports the results of this simulation. We find that it reduces systemic risk by about 
8%. This effect is large: the amount of sovereign debt reallocated in the process is only €96 bn. What 
drives this surprising reduction in AV? As in equation (13), we can break down the overall impact 
into three components. Most of the effect comes through the aggregate reduction in exposure. When 
reallocating GIIPS debt, we are reducing GIIPS exposure of non-GIIPS banks (on average, by 0.2% 
of total assets), while increasing the exposure of most GIIPS banks (on average, by some 0.03% of 
                                                 
8 The only country in our sample where domestic banks own more than 80% of the aggregate bank holdings is the UK 
(81.6%).  
20%  sk 
anmnk
ammmk
mforeign
 
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their total assets).
9 Given that GIIPS banks, in our data, are on average less levered than non-GIIPS 
banks (with a debt-to-equity ratio of 21 compared to 23), this results in an overall reduction in AV.  
 
Euro-bonds: Suppose we could substitute the sovereign portfolio of each bank with a new 
portfolio of sovereigns (1) which has the same size and (2) whose weights are the same across banks. 
This idea is, in effect, what policymakers had in mind when they proposed the “Eurobond.”  The 
intuition behind the Eurobond proposal was to break the loop between banks and their sovereigns, 
making local banks less sensitive to their own sovereign defaulting.  
To implement the Eurobond idea, we change the exposure mnk into sharesovk %sovn where 
sharesovk is the share of sovereign k in aggregate sovereign holdings, while %sovn is the share of 
sovereign holdings in bank n's portfolio. This reshuffling of bonds across banks preserves each 
bank’s total sovereign exposure, and aggregate bank holdings of each sovereign. But it makes banks 
more similar in terms of individual country exposure. In the context of our model, it is as if all banks 
were holding Eurobonds. The impact of the GIIPS shock on Eurobonds is determined by the weights 
of GIIPS countries vis-a-vis non-GIIPS countries in the aggregate sovereign bonds portfolio. 
Table 4 shows that this policy involves a considerable reshuffling of assets across banks: 
some 1.6tn euro of bonds change owners. It also increases AV. As in the previous experiment, the 
reason is that exposure to distressed sovereigns is reallocated to banks that are more levered, so that 
only the “exposure change” components appears. The intuition is that non-GIIPS banks are both less 
exposed but more levered in the data. The eurobond experiment transfers GIIPS debt from GIIPS 
banks to non-GIIPS banks, and therefore increases exposure of the most levered banks.  
                                                 
9 Some GIIPS banks experience a decrease in exposure. This happens because these banks own a lot of GIIPS debt but 
relatively little of their own sovereign (for instance most Italian banks own much a lot of non-Italian debt, and relatively 
less Italian debt). As a result, the policy reduces overall exposure to GIIPS for these banks.  
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Ring-fencing risky assets: Perhaps more targeted policies can make the most systemic banks 
safer? To understand the effect of a merger, let us assume that banks indexed by n are merged 
together into a bank denoted by *. Noting that the merger preserves the quantity of assets, it is 
straightforward to show that (see Appendix for a formal proof): 

**
 merged
.
m
mm m
m
a
AV b r b r
E
   
        
  (14) 
The interpretation of equation (14) is simple: if banks that are larger or more connected have a 
levered exposure bmrm lower than the merged entity b*r*, then the merger increases systemic risk. 
The intuition is that the merger creates contagion: banks that are relatively large and connected, but 
less exposed, are protected against the shock. By being merged into an entity with larger exposure, 
these assets become vulnerable to fire sales, increasing AV. 
Suppose now that the regulator merges the most exposed banks into a single large bank. For 
each bank, we define as ‘exposure’ the fraction of bank equity that would be lost directly in a 50% 
write-down of GIIPS debt. We then study three scenarios: merge all banks with exposure above 
50%, above 100% and above 150% of their own equity. This means merging 47, 20 and 9 banks, 
respectively.  
Table 4 shows that the effect of the bank mergers is nearly zero. The reason is that the 
policy regroups banks that have very similar levered exposure bmrm. And, as equation (14) 
demonstrates, the expected change in AV is small when expected leverage adjusted-exposure rn1 is 
the same across merged firms. In this case, ring-fencing does not reduce systemic risk: the policy 
simply transforms several similar small banks into one big bank with the same exposure.  
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Merging exposed banks with unexposed ones: Suppose we merge the 20 most exposed banks 
with the banks that are unexposed to the GIIPS write-down (6 of the 90 banks do not hold any GIIPS 
debt). To isolate the impact of merging the two groups, we first merge the exposed banks together, 
then merge the unexposed banks together, and then finally perform the full merger. Merging 
unexposed banks does not change AV, because of the effect discussed in the previous experiment: 
they are identical with respect to the shock. For the same reason, merging exposed banks does not 
change things much either. Merging the two groups into one bank does, however, increase systemic 
risk by 20% of aggregate equity. The intuition is that the assets of unexposed banks, which were 
previously not sold in response to the shock, become contaminated by the poor performance of 
GIIPS debt.  
 
Leverage cap: We next study the impact of capping leverage. Here, the policy is much 
simpler: if x is the cap, then, for all banks with leverage above x, we set D/E =x. We implicitly 
assume these banks can raise equity to reach the maximum leverage, but do not change their sizes. 
Economically in our model, such a policy reduces the need for banks to fire-sell assets, so it 
unambiguously reduces AV. From Equation (6) we see that: 
 
The policy is more effective when targeted banks are either (1) bigger, (2) more exposed, or (3) hold 
large asset classes.  
We try three different caps (knowing we capped leverage to 30 in the data): 15, 20 and 25. 
We calculate the amount of equity capped banks need to raise to reach this cap: for instance capping 
leverage at 15 (25
th percentile) requires banks to raise a staggering of €480 bn. The table shows that, 
   11 1 k ' ' 1
' n is large n is large
n  holds large asset classes
  , with  nn n n k k n k n
nk n
AV E l b a r m s s m a

 
       
 
 
 
  
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to obtain a significant reduction in systemic risk, the regulator would need to set a very drastic cap. 
For instance, capping leverage at 25 (this is leverage at the 63
rd percentile bank) only reduces 
vulnerability to a GIIPS shock from 245 to 238% of aggregate equity. The impact of reducing 
leverage to 20 is much larger.  
 
E.  Optimizing capital injection 
We have seen above that capping leverage is the only policy that delivers sizeable 
reductions in AV. The cost of this policy is large (approximately €480bn) and the action quite drastic, 
since it recapitalizes all banks with leverage above 15. Here we ask whether AV can be reduced by 
injecting different amounts of equity into different banks. The idea is to potentially identify banks 
are either less connected (their portfolio differs from other banks) or smaller, so that recapitalizing 
them may be less necessary, in which case the recapitalization can be done at lower cost. 
Suppose the regulator has a given amount of cash F available to invest in bank equity, and 
cares only about reducing spillovers between banks in a deleveraging cycle. Equity injection into 
banks is given by the vector f = (f1,…,fN), so that  . When a bank receives fn euros of fresh 
equity, we assume the entire amount is used to repay existing debt, so that its debt to equity ratio 
becomes (Dn– fn)/(En+ fn).  
We minimize Eq. (8) subject to the constraints that 
 
and (Dn – fn)/(En + fn)=bn  for 
each bank. We also impose the constraint that the regulator cannot withdraw cash from equity-rich 
banks, so that fn>0 for all n.  
Optimizing equity injection across banks allows us to reduce aggregate vulnerability in a 
more cost-effective way than any of the policy experiments we previously considered. We report in 
the last panel of Table 4 the reduction in AV obtained through the optimal injection of €200bn: AV  
1 f F  
1 f F   
  29
decreases by .26, which is much bigger than any other policy except the leverage cap at 15, which  
costs €480bn. In our model, there are large gains from optimizing. 
We then seek to characterize the optimal recapitalization that comes from the model. Table 
5 then reports the optimal equity injections for each bank. We only report the 20 largest banks, 
ranked by the size of their equity injection. This list consists mostly of Italian, Spanish and Greek 
banks.  
By construction, the optimal injection is highly correlated with systemicness (ρ=0.91). 
Correlation with the four components of systemicness is lower: ρ=0.16 (leverage), ρ=0.16 (Size), 
ρ=0.38 (direct exposure), ρ=0.21 (linkage). This shows that when deciding to inject fresh capital into 
banks, the regulator should consider all components of systemicness to minimize taxpayers’ 
investment. 
 
F.  Extensions and other policy interventions 
Earlier we suggested that the model could be adjusted for different liquidation rules. A 
natural one to consider is one in which banks first sell off their most liquid assets. Here we focus on 
an extreme case and show its impact on our simulations.  
Suppose that banks have the flexibility to sell their sovereign bonds, but that their other 
assets (primarily loans) are infinitely illiquid, meaning that their early disposal would yield zero 
proceeds. In this case, the banks would have to concentrate their liquidations of sovereign bonds 
alone. In this case, we can write down a modified version of the formula for aggregate vulnerability 
AV to a shock S: 
 
(15) 
*
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where M* is a weight matrix that accounts for the fact that non-sovereigns are not liquidated. Each 
element is given by:   We only focus on factors k which corresponds to sovereign 
holdings. Hence, elements of M* are bigger: banks will liquidate more sovereigns in response to an 
adverse shock to their balance sheets. 
A striking feature of these simulations is that aggregate vulnerability is much lower. The 
aggregate vulnerability of banks to a GIIPS write-down is now 23%, instead of 285%.  This is 
because changing the liquidation rule has two opposite effects. On the one hand, banks liquidate 
more sovereign bonds, which has a stronger price impact on other banks. On the other hand, fire 
sales don’t contaminate other assets, which in this case are the majority of assets held on bank 
balance sheets. This analysis suggests that in a moment of crisis, flexibility not to sell lowers the 
threat of fire sales related contagion. Stepping outside of the model, one can perhaps view this as 
saying that flexibility not to mark all assets to market can be beneficial during times of distress. 
Table 6 reports values of AV for alternative liquidation rules. We progressively add other 
asset classes to the list of liquid assets. As can be seen, as long as the list of liquid assets is small 
enough (i.e. corresponds to less than 41% of bank assets), aggregate vulnerability is reduced by 
illiquidity of the other assets. Illiquidity prevents banks from transmitting their shocks to otherwise 
immune banks. When, however, sellable assets take up a larger fraction of the balance sheet (in our 
simulations, this happens as soon as we include corporate loans), then the fire sale concentration 
effect starts dominating the “ring fencing” effect: because banks cannot liquidate everything, they 
sell more liquid assets, which increases the price impact and therefore contagion.  
 
VI. Conclusions 

* /. ik ik ik k mm m   
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The main purpose of stress tests is for the regulator to ensure that banks can survive 
economic scenarios in which the value of their assets is severely impaired. Our paper suggests that 
data recovered from examinations can be made useful far beyond this narrow task, and in particular 
can be an important input into measures of overall systemic risk. The key idea underlying our 
analysis is that fire sales of bank assets can spread distress across financial institutions. We use this 
idea, combined with assumptions about how banks will behave following shocks to net worth, to 
show how the resulting fire sales may spill over.  
A limitation of the model is that we do not fully take into account some of the steps that 
banks can take to avoid selling assets. That is, our model is most useful for understanding how the 
dominos fall when all banks are up against hard constraints. But prior to this point, banks may have 
some flexibility. They may first try to sell their most liquid assets (although if all banks do this, they 
may discover that these assets are not so liquid). And even after running out of liquid assets to sell, 
banks may ask for forebearance, or use accounting flexibility to avoid recognizing losses.  We have 
described some of these extensions here, but it is surely important to incorporate richer and more 
microfounded bank reaction functions into our framework. 
While our model is quite stylized, it generates a number of useful insights concerning the 
distribution of risks in the financial sector. The model crystalizes why regulators should pay close 
attention to risks that are concentrated in the most levered banks. The model also suggests that 
microprudential policies that explicitly target bank solvency, such as was implicit in both the 
European and US stress tests, may be far from optimal, especially when taken from the perspective 
of controlling contagion.   
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Table 1. Vulnerability to a 50% write-off on all GIIPS Debt. We compute the vulnerability of the major 
European banks to a 50% write-down on all sovereign debt of Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain. In column 
1, IV(n) denotes the indirect vulnerability via sector-wide deleveraging as we define it in Equation (10), adjusted for 
the fact that total fire sales are capped by total assets (see Section II.A.). In column 3, DV(n) denotes the direct 
vulnerability to the write-down on balance-sheets, as defined in Equation (9), adjusted for maximal fire sales. Both 
measures are normalized by bank equity. In the last line of the table, we also report sample averages: Hence, a 50% 
write-down on all GIIPS debt would wipe out 111% of the equity of the average bank through the direct impact, 
while the indirect impact via deleveraging would create an additional loss of 302% of equity. 
 
Bank Name 
Indirect 
Vulnerability as a 
Fraction of Equity 
Direct 
Vulnerability as a 
Fraction of Equity  
  IV(n) Rank DV(n) Rank 
Allied Irish Banks  35.24  1  11.9  2 
Agricultural Bank of Greece  12.98  2  33.5  1 
West  LB  8.80 3  0.9 25 
Banca Monte Dei Baschi di Siena  5.08  4  3.7  3 
Oesterreichische  Volksbank  4.83 5  0.2 56 
SNS  Bank  4.71 6  0.3 55 
Caixa de Aforros  4.70  7  1.4  11 
NordDeustche  Landesbank  4.61 8  0.4 51 
Commerzbank  AG  4.54 9  1.0 21 
Caixa d’Estalvis de Catalunya  4.36  10  0.8  31 
      
Full sample average  3.02     1.11    
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Table 2. Vulnerability to GIIPS and Cumulative Stock Returns. For each publicly listed bank in our sample, we 
calculate the cumulative return between Dec 31, 1999 and July 29, 2011, or between July 1, 2011 and July 29, 2011. 
We then regress this return on our measure of indirect vulnerability to a sovereign debt writedown, controlling for 
banks’ direct exposure. The writedown considered is a 50% haircut on the debt of Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, 
and Spain. Controls include bank size (log of assets), and leverage. Robust t-statistics in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
  Cumulative Return: Dec 2009-July 2011  July 2011 Return 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Indirect Vulnerability IV -0.022***  -0.010***  -0.012***  -0.008** -0.001 -0.002** 
  [-4.52] [-2.79] [-3.44] [-2.52] [-0.94] [-2.03] 
Direct Vulnerability DV  -0.021***  -0.012*   -0.012***  -0.015*** 
   [-3.09]  [-1.94]   [-10.27]  [-4.65] 
log(assets)     0.098***      -0.024 
     [3.24]      [-1.01] 
Debt to Equity Ratio      -0.003      0.006 
     [-0.34]      [1.20] 
Constant -0.241***  -0.249***  0.282 -0.071***  -0.076*** -0.315 
  [-4.25] [-4.52] [1.07] [-3.12] [-3.47] [-1.62] 
        
Observations  49 49 49 49 49 49 
R-squared  0.094 0.150 0.248 0.070 0.181 0.235 
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Table 3.  Systemicness Ranking in Response to a GIIPS shock. We calculate the systemicness S(n) of each 
individual bank, assuming a 50% write-off on GIIPS sovereign debt. Systemicness is defined in equation (7) of this 
article and refers to the contribution of a particular bank to the aggregate vulnerability of the banking system. We 
report detailed information for the top ten systemic banks. Columns 2, 3, and 4 report the elements of the 
decomposition of systemicness from equation (8). Column 2 reports total exposure of each bank, normalized by 
aggregate equity. Column 3 reports the fraction of assets that would be fire-sold as a fraction of total exposure. 
Because of our cap, it is always smaller than 1. Column 4 focuses on the linkage effect. The last line presents the 
sum of systemicness over the 90 banks in our sample, which is equal to Aggregate Vulnerability AV. A 50% write-
down on GIIPS debt would wipe out, through deleveraging 245% of total bank equity. Note that our decomposition 
accounts for the fact that fire sales induced by the write-off are capped by total assets. 
 
Bank Name  Systemicness  
 
 
 S(n) 
Assets / 
Aggregate 
Banking 
System  	
Equity 
 
   
  
  
Fire sales 
 
   
max     
     ,1
    
      	
 
Linkage effect 
 
 
   
Banco Santander  0.21  1.06  0.58  0.34 
Unicredit 0.19  0.88  0.69  0.31 
Intesa SanPaolo  0.19  0.62  0.95  0.33 
BBVA 0.18  0.57  0.94  0.33 
BNP Paribas  0.15  1.37  0.36  0.30 
BFA-Bankia 0.12  0.29  0.95  0.42 
Caja de Ahorros Y Pensiones de Barcelona  0.10  0.27  0.93  0.38 
Societe Generale  0.07  0.75  0.32  0.32 
Commerzbank AG  0.07  0.66  0.48  0.23 
Banca Monte Dei Baschi di Siena  0.06  0.22  0.92  0.32 
        
Full Sample Average  0.03  0.27  0.44  0.30 
Full Sample Total AV  2.45          
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Table 4. Impact of Various Policies on Aggregate Vulnerability of European Banking Sector. The first line reports the aggregate vulnerability of the 
European banks to a 50% GIIPS write-down: induced deleveraging would destroy 245% of aggregate bank equity. The remaining rows of the table show this 
calculation under different hypothetical policy interventions.  
 
     Aggregate Vulnerability  Contribution of change in distribution of 
Policy intervention  Detail  Summary Statistics  (deviation / benchmark)  Asset  Connectedness  Exposure 
            
Baseline     0.00       
GIIPS debt re-nationalization (bn euros)  Fraction of total renationalized      
 96  0.2  -0.08  0.01  -0.01  -0.08 
Eurobonds (swap individual sov. holdings   Total amount of sovereign reshuffled (in bn €)    
  for the same basket of sovereigns)  1672  0.08  0.00  0.00  0.09 
   Number of banks merged      
Merge banks on which a GIIPS shock  x = 50%  47  0.13       
  is at least x% of equity  x = 100%  20  0.01       
  x = 150%  9  0.00       
   Number of Banks Merged      
Merge banks on which a GIIPS shock  Merge exposed only  20  0.01       
 is at least 100% of equity 
Merge unexposed 
only 6  0.00       
 with banks totally unexposed  Merge all  26  0.08       
   Equity Injection (in bn €)      
Leverage cap   max D/E = 15  480  -0.28       
  max D/E = 20  173  -0.11       
  max D/E = 25  45  -0.03       
Optimized equity injection of €200bn  Countries        
 200  All  Europe  -0.26       
 200  German  banks  -0.05       
  200  German + French  -0.09       
   200  GIIPS  -0.24          
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Table 5. Optimal Equity Allocation to Reduce Aggregate Vulnerability to a GIIPS shock. We assume the social 
planner has 200bn euros to inject, and seeks the allocation of capital increases that maximizes the reduction in 
Aggregate Vulnerability. We only report here the top 20 receivers. Column 1 reports optimal equity injection, in 
billions of euros. Column 2 reports systemicness S(n). Columns 3-6 provide the four components of systemicness as 
in equation (8) from the text: target leverage, size, exposure to the shock, and connectedness to other banks.  
 
Bank  
Equity 
Injection   
(bn 
euros) 
Systemic
ness S(n) 
Assumed 
Target 
Leverage 
Size   
(ai/E1) 
Exposure 
to GIP 
shock   
(ei'MS) 
Linkage 
effect 
(1'AMLM'ei) 
Banca Monte Dei ...Siena  18.20  0.17  30.00  0.22  0.08  0.32 
Intesa  Sanpaolo  S.P.A  18.20 0.23  21.43  0.62 0.05  0.33 
Caja De Ahorros Y Pensiones Bcn.  17.90  0.16  22.38  0.27  0.07  0.38 
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria   17.77 0.22  20.87  0.57 0.06  0.33 
Bfa-Bankia  17.40 0.16  28.63  0.29 0.05  0.42 
Banco Santander S.A.  12.04  0.21  22.99  1.06  0.03  0.34 
Unicredit  S.P.A  12.00 0.19  22.39  0.88 0.03  0.31 
Banco  Popolare  8.11 0.07  30.00  0.13 0.05  0.36 
Bnp  Paribas  6.04 0.15  22.62  1.37 0.02  0.30 
Banco De Sabadell  4.68  0.04  25.26  0.10  0.04  0.40 
Banco Comercial Português  4.34  0.04  27.16  0.10  0.04  0.34 
Ubi  Banca  4.13 0.04  20.37  0.15 0.04  0.33 
Banco Popular Español  3.53  0.03  18.50  0.14  0.04  0.35 
National Bank Of Greece  3.52  0.03 12.64 0.11 0.09  0.28 
Efg Eurobank Ergasias   3.26  0.03  22.88  0.08  0.06  0.26 
Commerzbank  Ag  3.14 0.07  30.00  0.66 0.02  0.23 
Bank  Of  Ireland  2.98 0.03  29.36  0.17 0.02  0.32 
Caja De Ahorros Del Mediterráneo  2.96  0.03  30.00  0.07  0.04  0.34 
Piraeus  Bank  Group  2.69 0.02  16.69  0.05 0.09  0.34 
Caixa De Aforros De Galicia  2.66  0.03  30.00  0.07  0.04  0.36 
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Table 6: Robustness to Liquidation Rules. We calculate the aggregate vulnerability AV to a 50% writedown of  
GIIPS debt. In line 1, we report the baseline AV. In line 2, we assume only sovereigns can be sold. In line 3, we 
assume sovereigns and commercial real estate only can be sold. In line 4, we add mortgages to the list of assets that 
can be sold. In line 7, we include all known assets (typically about 80 % of total exposure). The difference here with 
the first line is that we assume banks have no cash to adjust. 
 
  Aggregate Vulnerability AV  Liquid assets / total 
Benchmark AV -2.85  1.00 
Liquidate Sovereigns only  -0.23  0.12 
 + Commercial real estate  -0.47  0.18 
 + Mortgages  -2.40  0.41 
 + Corporate loans  -4.11  0.68 
 + Consumer loans  -4.02  0.70 
 + SME loans  -3.84  0.75 
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Appendix A: Allowing Equity Issuance as a Substitute for Asset Sales 
 
Below we show that if we allow banks to deleverage by raising equity, then most of the terms 
derived in our benchmark model (IV, AV, Systemicness) can be written in the same way but subject 
to a simple scaling factor. 
Consider a bank with assets of 10, financed by equity of 2 and debt of 8. Suppose the bank 
gets a return shock that takes assets down to 9. In our model, the bank sells an additional 4 units of 
assets to get back to target leverage of 4-to-1. However, the bank could simply raise equity, or 
combine equity issuance with asset purchases. For example, if the bank raised ½ a unit of equity, and 
uses the proceeds to pay debt, it would only have to do asset sales of 1.5 units: indeed, its new 
leverage would be (1+1/2)/(8-1/2-3/2)=4, which is the target. 
To describe this generally, we need to specify the propensity of each bank to rely on one tool 
versus the other.  One simple way to do this is to assume that equity issues and asset sales both 
contribute at the margin to a constant fraction of deleveraging. 
We proceed in two steps: we first derive a simple rule to pin-down the relative proportions of 
asset sales vs. equity issuance across banks. Next, following a given shock   , we compute the 
quantities of assets sold by each bank. 
 
Step 1: A simple bank-specific rule for the relative use of asset sales vs. equity issuance in 
deleveraging 
Consider bank n prior to any shock. Suppose that bank n delevers by combining the sale of a 
quantity    of assets and an issuance of equity,          . At the margin, the effect of asset sales    
and equity issuance    on leverage is: 
∆   
   
   
	    
   
   
   
Assuming that asset sales and equity issues account a constant fraction (across banks) of 
deleveraging means that there exists a constant x (the same for all banks) such that: 
 
   
   
   
 
   
   
	   
    
Now, assuming equity issuance proceeds are used to pay back debt (as asset sales), we have: 
    
            
            
	, 
which implies, using simple algebra that: 
 
 
   
   
 
 
   
   
	 
 1 
         
          1     
Thus, for a bank with leverage   , we assume that deleveraging happens in the following 
proportions:  
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1    
 
This is just a simple deleveraging rule concerning the relative use of asset sales vs. equity issues, 
which we have derived from a computation at the margin of banks target leverage. 
 
Step 2: Computing asset sales after a shock when equity is also issued to deleverage 
The next step is to compute for each bank n how much equity is issued and assets sold 
following a shock     . When doing this computation, we assume the relative proportions of assets 
sold and debt issued are as above and that banks target to return to leverage   .  
Applying the formulas in the paper, we have that   ,    solve: 
              
   1    
                
     
We can then solve for    by rewriting this equation, using           and        /         : 
     
1
1  
      
      
The vector of net asset purchases is therefore :	
1
1  
         
This means that our model including equity issuance can be rewritten identically to the benchmark 
presented in the paper, with a factor of 
 
    in front of all terms, where x measures the intensity of the 
use of equity issues versus asset sales in rebalancing. In short, the results of the model do not 
qualitatively hinge on whether asset sales are the exclusive technique that banks use to deleverage. 
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Appendix B: Sequential and Partial Deleveraging 
 
In this Appendix, we show how the model can be extended to include sequential rounds of 
deleveraging. We also introduce the partial leverage adjustment process. 
 
B.1. Sequential Deleveraging Rounds 
 
The model defined in the paper can be readily extended to multiple rounds of adjustments. The only 
difference is that, in this case, the asset matrix A changes every period, as banks make losses and sell 
assets. In other words, the asset matrix is now the state variable of the dynamic system.  
 
Taking this into account, the system can now be written as: 
 
 
 
 
 
               .max     , 1      
          
   .    0,1        
 
.     
  
                  .        
 
 
where en is the vector with 1 as its n-th component and zeros elsewhere.     is the diagonal matrix 
of inverse initial equity of banks, expressed in (or euros). Banks’ assets are first reduced by direct 
exposure to shocks, and then by any consequences from deleveraging. The t+1-round vulnerability 
vector       is the vector of accumulated bank losses due to deleveraging in each round. There is no 
closed form because asset sizes change in each iteration. 
 
The system evolves in one of two possible regimes. For price impact L small enough, contagion is 
low and IV converges geometrically. In this case, the sequential round extension does not change 
much the vulnerability of systemicness rankings across banks. We have verified this result using 
simulations and considering the same 50% GIIPS writedown shock used in this article. For price 
impact L large enough, however, the shocks are so big that banking assets are quickly wiped out by 
the rounds of deleveraging. In this case, all banks can destroy each other (systemic) and are quickly 
destroyed (vulnerable). In this case, the multiple round extension makes the system diverge and thus 
all banks are equally systemic and vulnerable. 
 
 
B.2. Allowing for partial adjustment 
 
Suppose now that banks only partially adjust their assets to restore their leverage. We model 
deleveraging as follows: Denote   
    the leverage matrix that would be reached by banks if they 
did not sell any assets as a response to the negative shock   . We will assume that, at round t, banks 
targets    	 	 1      
    where   measures the intensity by which banks seek to return to pre-
shock target. The dynamics of the system can be described by: 
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            ′  1    I            
 
.     
   	  
           	 	 1      
   
             .  1          I        I        	max 0,1    I           
          
    I         I            0,1    I          
 
.     
  
                  .        
 
 
, where I is the identity matrix.  
 
The dynamic system now has two state variables: leverage    and assets   . Every period, banks 
seek to return to initial leverage    but only partially so.  
 
Does slow adjustment affect the convergence of the system? One potential worry could be that banks 
never manage to return to target leverage    because the feedback force   is too weak, or because 
deleveraging spirals prevent banks from adjusting leverage enough. To check this, we have 
experimented with computing AV for different levels of lambda. For low values of  , convergence is 
slower, but it is still achieved after only 10 rounds for   0 . 4 . But comparing the eventual levels of 
cumulative aggregate vulnerability, the striking fact is that they are all quite similar. With immediate 
adjustment (  1 ), cumulative AV is 2.5% of aggregate equity. With very progressive adjustment 
(  0 . 4 ), cumulative AV is 2.1%. What this simulation shows is the essentially linear nature of fire 
sales in our model. Whether they occur progressively or instantaneously, their cumulative impact is 
quite similar.  
 
We have also investigated whether partial adjustment affects the systemicness ranking. To do this, 
we run simulations with varying level of price impact L, and varying adjustment-to-target-leverage 
speed. For low price impact, our simulations suggest that the systemicness ranking is fully preserved 
after 20 rounds of progressive deleveraging. For higher price impact, the ranking is less and less 
preserved. The intuition for this is that, when there is a lack of liquidity in the system, all assets are 
quickly wiped out and all banks are equally systemic.  